An Analysis of Change-of-Terms Provisions as Used in Consumer Service Contracts of Adhesion by Horwitz, Eric Andrew
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Business Law Review
1-1-2006
An Analysis of Change-of-Terms Provisions as
Used in Consumer Service Contracts of Adhesion
Eric Andrew Horwitz
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric Andrew Horwitz, An Analysis of Change-of-Terms Provisions as Used in Consumer Service Contracts of Adhesion, 15 U. Miami Bus. L.
Rev. 75 (2007)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol15/iss1/4
AN ANALYSIS OF CHANGE-OF-TERMS PROVISIONS AS
USED IN CONSUMER SERVICE CONTRACTS
OF ADHESION
ERIC ANDREW HORWITZ*
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 75
II. COMMON LAW CONTRACT FORMATION ................ 77
A. Indefinite Performance and the Rolling Contract ............ 77
B. Indefinite Duration and the Periodic Contract .............. 82
III. STATUTORYAND REGULATORYAUTHORITY ............. 85
A. Credit Practices .................................... 85
1. Federal Law .................................. 85
2. State Law .................................... 87
B. Bait and Switch .................................... 90
1. Federal Law .................................. 90
2. State Law .................................... 93
C . M iscellaneous ..................................... 94
IV. COMMON LAW DEFENSES ............................. 97
A. Reasonable Expectations .............................. 97
B. Unconscionability .................................. 100
1. Procedural Unconscionability ................... 101
2. Substantive Unconscionability .................. 103
C. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing ......... 105
V. CONCLUSION ....................................... 108
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine entering into a year-long contract for cable service with an
advertised monthly fee of fifty dollars. Then, afterjust a few months into the
contract, the cable company sends out a notice that the new rate is sixty
dollars a month for the remainder of the contract. To add insult to injury,
they are also reducing the channel lineup. According to the cable company,
the subscriber agreement contains a provision stating: "We reserve the right
to change the terms of the contract at any time, including the price and
extent of service, as long as we send out notice of the change." In the event
you do not agree to the change, you must cancel the contract, which in turn
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gratitude towards Professor Alan C. Swan, as he agreed to be my faculty advisor. Also, I appreciate the
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triggers an early termination fee. Does this change-of-terms' provision
effectively allow the cable company to modify the monthly rate under a
contract of fixed length?
At first blush, it may seem that the answer is in fact yes. By consenting
to the contract, which reserved this right to the cable company, it would
appear that the increased price complied with the terms. Then again, just
how valid is a promise to be bound to unknown terms? Do consumer
protection laws prevent or allow such questionable business practices? What
about the common law concepts of unconscionability and reasonable
expectations? Does it matter that cancellation fees apply in the event that the
consumer does not agree to the new terms? Clearly, it seems that numerous
questions exist with respect to the determination of an answer. Of course, it
should be assumed throughout this article that any changes would be
unfavorable to the consumer.
This article explores the application of change-of-terms provisions to
various types of adhesive service contracts. For instance, a contract with a
definite duration poses different problems than a contract at-will. Even
though these change-of-terms provisions mainly appear in leases and service
contracts, since they deal with an on-going relationship as opposed to a one-
time sale of goods,2 analogies can be drawn from rolling contracts. This
article aims to explore the current state of the law regarding these provisions
and why they should not be enforced. Whether or not the consumer may opt
out of a contract mistakes the point. Rather, this article points out that the
modified terms should not incorporate themselves into the contract in the
first place. Also, as the title states, this analysis refers to consumer contracts
of adhesion.3
Part II of this article will lay the foundation for later analysis by first
examining the basics of common law contract formation and how change-of-
terms provisions affect the formation process. Part III looks to state and
federal legislatures and regulatory agencies for guidance in this area of
contract law. Part IV of the paper will explore how the common law defends
against these provisions in contracts; namely, the doctrines of reasonable
I This can also be referred to a change-in-terms provision, but the former phrase will be used
throughout this article.
2 This on-going nature resembles an "executory" contract insomuch as the parties' promises have
not been fully performed from the outset. See 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS S 1:19
(4th ed. 1991).
3 "A standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker
position, usu. a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 342 (8th ed. 2004).
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expectations, unconscionability and the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Part V concludes with a summary of the findings.
Ul. COMMON LAW CONTRACT FORMATION
Before one can analyze the scope of a change-of-terms provision, one
must first determine if a contract exists and if so, the duration of the parties'
obligations. Going back to the basics, a contract exists when two or more
parties form a bargain consisting of "mutual assent.., and a consideration."4
Mutual assent typically refers to one party's acceptance of another party's
offer.' Consideration refers to the substantive nature of the offer, which
requires an exchange of promises, performances, or a promise for a perfor-
mance.' "A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from
acting in a specified way .... , Performance refers to the inevitable action or
the refraining from action pursuant to the promise. The promisor refers to
the person that would perform - act or refrain from acting-pursuant to the
promise, while the promisee refers to the person that would be required to
give mutual consideration in return for this performance.' The typical way
to give mutual consideration for a promisor's eventual performance would
be to give a return promise or performance which would constitute "a gain,
advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss, disadvantage, or detriment to
the promisee."9 Of course, a promisor's eventual performance, vis-a-vis the
promisee, must also satisfy the requirements of consideration.
A. Indefinite Performance and the Rolling Contract
In adhesive consumer contracts, the adhesive form constitutes the offer
and the consumer's signature manifests acceptance. However, acceptance
requires that the terms of the offer be ascertainable. "Even though a
manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot
be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are
reasonably certain." 0 In order for mutual assent to exist, the consumer must
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 17(1) (1981).
s See S 22(1).
6 See S 3. An exchange of promises would create a bilateral contract. See 1 RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS S1:17 (4th ed. 1991). For the most part, consumer service contracts will fall
under this classification.
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theoretically be able to determine the extent of his promise as well as that of
the drafter, even if the average consumer would be unable to understand the
boilerplate terms. In the event that the terms are subject to change, no one
could ever understand the actual extent of the offer. Nonetheless, one can
always attempt to define the boundaries of the offer by taking into account
the part of the offer explicitly defined. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts summarizes the general consensus of the common law with
respect to this concept:
It is sometimes said that the agreement must be capable of being
given an exact meaning and that all the performances to be rendered
must be certain. Such statements may be appropriate in determining
whether a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as
an offer. But the actions of the parties may show conclusively that
they have intended to conclude a binding agreement, even though
one or more terms are missing or are left to be agreed upon. In such
cases courts endeavor, if possible, to attach a sufficiently definite
meaning to the bargain."
Essentially, indefinite terms imply a lack of mutual assent, premised on
the consumer's inability to ascertain the exact scope of the offer in the first
place. Any conclusion that a consumer "assented" to an indefinite offer
would contradict itself. While it may be true that the consumer intended to
enter into an enforceable agreement, such intent would surely only relate to
the currently expressed terms as encompassing the entire scope of the
agreement, notwithstanding the change-of-terms provision. The existence
of a change-of-terms provision makes it impossible for a consumer to
ascertain, at the time of entering the contract, the exact consideration to be
exchanged over the course of the contract. As the Restatement suggests,
however, a court will strive to cure the indefiniteness and find a valid
contract. The easiest, and arguably the fairest, way to achieve this result
would be to simply strike the change-of-terms provision from the offer.
Indeed, an examination of the analogous concept of "rolling contracts"
demonstrates that some courts will follow this line of reasoning.
"A rolling contract is a deal in which the contract either is not formed
until, or is modified when, the last terms are presented for assent."' 2 This
issue commonly arises in the context of the shrinkwrap license. 3 Although
11 § 33 cmt. a.
12 William H. Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over Contract Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1099,
1099 (2004).
13 Software vendors enclose their product in shrinkwrap to prevent usage until the consumer has
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shrinkwrap licenses do not involve an on-going contractual relationship,
analogies can be drawn to the policy considerations employed by courts and
commentators alike. The relevant similarity crucial to drawing any sort of
analogy to rolling contracts and a change-of-terms provision is the notice that
additional, undisclosed terms apply to the offer, thereby making it impossible
for the consumer to know what acceptance entails. In the case of software,
the transaction normally alerts consumers to additional terms inside the
box, 4 which by definition cannot be read until after the time of the sale. In
the case of change-of-terms provisions, the contract alerts consumers to
additional terms currently undisclosed at the time of the contracting as well,
which by definition cannot be read until after the drafting party decides to
impose new terms."5 The issues of conditional acceptance and contract
modification arise in the analysis of rolling contracts as competing legal
theories.16
The case of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg'7 lends considerable support to the
idea that one cannot and should not be allowed to assent to terms that one
has not been given the opportunity to read. The facts are simple. Matthew
Zeidenberg bought a retail software package in order to use for his business.1"
The software manufacturer, ProCD, Inc., claimed that his usage of the soft-
ware violated their terms and conditions.' 9 However, these terms and con-
ditions were not viewable by Zeidenberg until after he bought and opened
the software box: "The sole reference to the user agreement was a disclosure
in small print at the bottom of the package, stating that defendants were
subject to the terms and conditions of the enclosed license agreement.,
20
The rationale underlying the district court's opinion in ProCD ultimately
hinged on the scope of the offer. Did this notice incorporate the terms by
reference into the offer itself or did the notice merely alert the consumer that
read and assented to the terms. See RobertJ. Morrill, Contract Formation and the Shrink Wrap License: A Case
Comment on ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 32 NEw ENG. L. REv. 513, 515-16 (1998); see also Kevin W.
Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of "Clickwrap" or "Shrinkwrap"Agreements Common in Computer Software,
Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R. 5TH 309 (West 2005).
14 Morrill, supra note 13, at 516-17.
is The difference, albeit minor, is that a change-of-terms provision does not always present
additional terms during the life of the contract.
16 One theory involves the formation of the original contract, in which the notice of additional
terms affects the manner in which the consumer can accept the offer. The other theory presumes that a
contract forms at the time of sale, and the additional terms merely constitute proposals for modification.
See Robert A. Hillman, Symposium: A Tribute to ProfessorJoseph M. Perillo: Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 743, 744 (2002).
17 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996), overruled by 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
18 Id. at 645.
19 Id. at 644.
29 Id. at 654.
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the box contained modification proposals to create an optional and more
elaborate contractual relationship?" The district court viewed the box of
software as the full manifestation of the terms of the contract, treating the
"subject to terms and conditions" language as invalid under the circum-
stances. Without the purchaser being able to view the terms prior to
acceptance, incorporation by reference into the offer would render assent
impossible.22 As explained earlier in this article, acceptance requires an
opportunity to understand the offer. Therefore, the additional terms were
incorporated not into the initial offer, but rather into the proposals for
modifications.23
In the case of an adhesive service contract, a change-of-terms provision
seems to serve the same function as a notice on a software package that
additional terms exist. Applying the logic of the district court with respect to
unviewable terms at the time of acceptance, any future changes could not be
retroactively incorporated into the scope of the initial offer. All that a change-
of-terms provision does is allow for the drafter to unilaterally alter the terms
of the contract; this function does not serve to fill any gaps or cure
indefiniteness. Quite the contrary, the provision creates indefiniteness, as the
seemingly fixed terms potentially lose their definiteness. In order to cure this
defect, a court should follow the district court's logic in the ProCD case and
view such a provision as merely incorporating any future changes into
modification proposals. Since the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply
to service contracts, the normal common law principles of contract
modification would apply in its stead. As such, any acceptance of a change
would not bind the consumer since it would be not be supported by any
consideration.24 Even the doctrine of acceptance by silence would not work
21 See id. at 653.
2 Id. at 654 ("Mere reference to the terms at the time of initial contract formation does not
present buyers an adequate opportunity to decide whether they are acceptable. They must be able to read
and consider the terms in their entirety.").
23 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 645 (W.D. Wis. 1996) ("The potential
incorporation of the terms can occur only after the purchaser opens the package and has a reasonable
opportunity to inspect the user agreement."). According to the district court, these additional terms could
be treated as modification proposals under S 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code or as a battle-of-the
forms problem under S 2-207. See id. at 655. Since the district court reasoned that the terms would not
incorporate into the contract under either section, the specific classification was left undecided. See id.
However, based on the district court's earlier determination that the display of the software on the shelf
constituted the offer, id. at 651-52, the idea of a battle-of-the forms problem does not seem to work, since
the consumer would be simply accepting the offer by purchasing the software.
24 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 89 (1981). Indeed, the drafter of the contract
would have a pre-existing duty to perform the original contract notwithstanding the consumer's refusal
to accept the new terms. See S 73.
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in this circumstance, as consideration for the acceptance of the modification
would still be lacking nonetheless.
Unfortunately for Zeidenberg, Judge Easterbrook subsequently over-
turned the lower court's ruling.25 Easterbrook initially accepted the district
court's logic insomuch as the placement of the software constituted an offer
and that one cannot agree to hidden terms.26 However, Easterbrook further
reasoned that "one of the terms to which Zeidenberg agreed by purchasing the
software is that the transaction was subject to a license." 27 This conclusive
sentence requires scrutiny, for it implicitly recognized the fact that
Zeidenberg had "agreed" to the offer, pursuant to his purchase of the
software, and that a contract has indeed formed. This line of reasoning
contradicts itself, for Easterbrook first agreed with the district court on the
one hand that "[o]ne cannot agree to hidden terms" but immediately
thereafter reasoned that Zeidenberg had in fact "agreed" to be bound to terms
that were hidden from view prior to the purchase of the software. 8
Giving Easterbrook the benefit of the doubt, it seems quite possible that
he used the term "agreed" in a general sense, as opposed to a legal sense,
insomuch as Zeidenberg "agreed" that the software manufacturer required
acceptance to be conditioned on review of the license after purchasing the
software. This interpretation finds reinforcement by Easterbrook's
subsequent reasoning:
A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct,
and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes
acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor
proposes to treat as acceptance. And that is what happened. ProCD
proposed a contract that a buyer would accept by using the software
after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure.29
Essentially, Easterbrook reasoned that although the software on the shelf
constituted the offer, the notice of additional terms informed the consumer
that acceptance could only occur by first purchasing the software and then
25 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
26 Id. at 1450.
Id. (emphasis added).
2S Id. ("In Wisconsin, as elsewhere, a contract includes only the terms on which the parties have
agreed. One cannot agree to hidden terms, the [district court] concluded. So far, so good--but one of the
terms to which Zeidenberg agreed by purchasing the software is that the transaction was subject to a
license. Zeidenberg's position therefore must be that the printed terms on the outside of a box are the
parties' contract--except for printed terms that refer to or incorporate other terms.").
29 Id. at 1452.
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using the software. Therefore, prior to a contract forming, the terms would
no longer be hidden from view, as the consumer could read them prior to
using the software.
A lengthy discussion about the correctness of this logic would confuse
the point of this paper.30 Easterbrook's reasoning was only explained because
it represented an alternative view of the shrinkwrap license with respect to
contract formation. For purposes of drawing an analogy to a change-of-terms
provision, Easterbrook's reasoning would not work. Unlike a sale of goods,
the additional terms pursuant to a change-of-terms provision in a service
contract could only occur after performance had begun by both parties. To
hold otherwise, that the drafter conditioned acceptance on viewing the
additional terms as they were introduced, would create the absurd result that
acceptance could never occur. Since there would be a potentially indefinite
amount of changes that could be introduced throughout the life of the
relationship pursuant to the change-of-terms provision, Easterbrook's
reasoning would make contract formation conditioned on the acceptance of
the last of these changes. Since there would be no way to ascertain what the
"last" change would be, there would be no way to ascertain when acceptance
occurred. Therefore, the idea of conditional acceptance would not apply to
change-of-terms provisions in service contracts, leaving only the district
court's reasoning in ProCD applicable to the question of contract formation.
B. Indefinite Duration and the Periodic Contract
The duration of a contract also plays a very important part in determining
the effect of a change-of-terms provision. When a contract does not have any
sort of maximum duration but rather exists on a periodic basis, the drafter
may have the power to terminate the contract at-will, at least with respect to
preventing a renewal.
30 As an aside, Easterbrook's understanding of prior precedent and indeed his own reasoning is
quite troub'esome. For instance, examine his example of airline tickets: "[C]onsider the purchase of an
airline ticket. The traveler calls the carrier or an agent, is quoted a price, reserves a seat, pays, and gets a
ticket, in that order. The ticket contains elaborate terms, which the traveler can reject by canceling the
reservation. To use the ticket is to accept the terms, even terms that in retrospect are disadvantageous."
Id. at 1451 (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)). Aside from the obvious
problem that his example of the airline ticket did not mention that the passenger was alerted to a
conditional acceptance procedure, which would seem to be crucial to his decision in the case, the Supreme
Court case he relies upon never decided the issue. Shute, 499 U.S. at 590 ("[W]e do not address the
question whether respondents had sufficient notice of the forum clause before entering the contract for
passage. Respondents essentially have conceded that they had notice of the forum-selection provision.").
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The hallmark feature of an at-will contract is the ability of either party to
terminate the contract at any time and for any reason.3' With respect to
periodic contracts, the relevant concept of "at-will" refers to ending the
contract by preventing a renewal. Assuming a drafter could prevent a renewal
at-will, any unilateral change of the terms would merely indicate a revocation
of the old offer to continue the periodic contract in lieu of a new offer. For
a concrete example, consider the case of Bass v. Prime Cable of Chicago, Inc.
32
In its subscriber agreement, the cable television company had the provision:
"prices subject to change." 33 After providing notice, the company stopped
providing the customer's previously free cable guide until the customer
agreed to pay the new charge.34 Citing applicable case law, the court reasoned
that a "contract without a specified duration is terminable at will by either
party... [which] may be unilaterally modified."31 In consideration of accep-
tance of such changes, the cable provider agreed to provide future service that
it was "under no duty to provide.., after the end of each billing period."36
The explicit reference to billing periods highlights the periodic nature of
the relationship; the contract was terminable at-will with respect to
preventing a renewal. 37 Any future provision of service, after the drafter's
existing obligation for the remainder of the current period ended, would
constitute consideration for an acceptance of such a change, as the cable
provider could prevent a future renewal at any time and for any reason, or
none at all. Essentially, a change-of-terms provision of a periodic contract of
this sort does nothing more than state the inherent properties of such a
periodic relationship. Being as such, one can simply discount the provision
as mere surplusage. For instance, a drafter could terminate the contract at-
will by explicitly preventing the renewal, which would subsequently require
an affirmative acceptance of the new offer. A faster and easier method, which
31 19 Ric-ARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS S 54:39 (4th ed. 1991). Although this
specific citation refers to an employment contract, employment is merely a type of contract and therefore
the same principles apply to contracts in general. The same reasoning holds for property leases as well,
be it real or personal property. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 907 (8th ed. 2004). Therefore, principles
of leases and employment contracts carry over to consumer contracts as well for purposes of drawing
analogies.
32 674 N.E.2d 43 (11. App. Ct. 1996).
33 Brief and Argument for Appellant, Bass v. Prime Cable of Chicago, Inc., 1995 WL 17168460,
at *46 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 20, 1995).
34 Bass, 674 N.E.2d at 46.
35 Id. at 50.
36 Id. at51.
37 To hold that the contract could be terminated at-will during a period, after the customer had
paid for the period, would be a misreading of the case. Indeed, the language indicating that the cable
provider was under no duty to provide service after the current period necessarily implies that the cable
provider was under a duty to provide service during the current period.
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would accomplish the same result but differ somewhat in form, would be to
place the burden on the consumer to affirmatively reject the new terms.
Since the drafter could prevent the renewal in the first place, it only makes
sense that the drafter could also set the procedure by which renewal would
not be prevented. Assuming the drafter shifted the burden to the consumer,
acceptance by silence would most likely be the way of accepting the new
terms. In consideration of the acceptance of the modification, the drafter
would not exercise his right to terminate the contract by preventing the
renewal.
However, the drafter may not be able to prevent a renewal in the first
place, in which case the at-will logic does not apply with respect to periodic
contracts. For instance, consider the case of Morris v. Healy Lumber Co.3 8 The
lease in question provided that the lessor could terminate the contract upon
non-payment of rent; no other termination condition was listed with respect
to the lessor.39 Since the agreement would persist until the lessee gave one
month's notice to quit or failed to pay the rent, the periodic relationship
persisted indefinitely and could not be terminated at the will of the lessor.'
This renewal provision "bound the lessor as long as the lessee paid the rent,
and bound the lessee until he gave the calendar month's notice in writing."
41
As was the case here, when a renewal provision gives the consumer the
option to renew the current offer, such a provision must be completely
unambiguous. 42 In order to exercise the option to renew the contract, the
lessee was required to refrain from giving notice one month in advance.
Assuming notice was not given, and the contract was thus renewed, the
failure to pay rent would merely be a breach, which has nothing to do with
the power of the lessor to prevent the periodic renewal of the contract in the
first place. Regardless of whether an option requires affirmative conduct or
an abstention of conduct to exercise said option, the drafter would still be
unable to terminate the current offer at-will with respect to preventing a
renewal. Thus, in the context of a periodic service contract that gives the
consumer the option to renew the contract at the end of a period, a change-
of-terms provision could not be discounted as surplusage because the drafter
would be powerless to prevent the renewal in the first place.
38 46 Wash. 686 (1907).
9 The lease stated: "Failure to pay said rent when the same falls due may be treated as a forfeiture
of this lease by the parties of the first part." Id. at 688.
40 See id. at 690.
41 Id.
42 See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Suffiiency of Provision of Lease to Effect Second or Perpetual Right of
Renewal, 29 A.L.R. 4TH 172 S 2 (1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1981)
(explaining option contracts).
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Il. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Assuming that a change-of-terms provision does not work violence upon
the common law requirement of definiteness, administrative and legislative
bodies are quite capable of forbidding such practices. On the other hand,
these same bodies are quite capable of allowing such practices regardless of
indefiniteness. However, an examination of state and federal statutes and
regulations reveals very little with respect to change-of-terms provisions
either way. The statutes and regulations, for the most part, deal entirely with
credit practices. However, the general prohibitions against unfair and
deceptive trade practices arguably encompass and forbid these provisions in
other types of contracts as well.
A. Credit Practices
The lending of consumer credit has received significant statutory
attention on both the federal and state level. For the most part, it appears that
change-of-terms provisions pass legislative muster.
1. FEDERAL LAW
On the federal front, the Truth in Lending Act strives "to protect the
consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card
practices. "43 In order to help effectuate this goal, the "Board [of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System] shall prescribe regulations to carry out the
purposes of this [Act]."44 Accordingly, the Board promulgated Regulation Z
in an effort to specify the disclosure requirements of consumer lending by
national banks.45 As this regulates the disclosures of the finance charges, such
as the annual percentage rate ("APR"),' the relevance of a change-of-terms
provision must be narrowly examined in the context of changing the
economic terms.47
43 15 U.S.C.A. S 1601(a) (West 2006).
" S 1604(a). "The term 'Board' refers to the Board of'Governors of the Federal Reserve System."
S 1602(b).
45 See 12 C.F.R. S 226.1 (2006).
46 See id.
47 In other words, terms such as arbitration requirements or forum-selection clauses would not
be covered under the Truth in Lending Act even though they would be covered under a change-of-terms
analysis generally.
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With respect to open-end home equity plans, Regulation Z for the most
part indirectly prohibits unilateral changes by the creditor. As a consequence
of this, a creditor cannot arbitrarily change the APR.48 Support for this
assertion comes from the official staff interpretation of Regulation Z.49 This
necessarily means that a fixed-rate APR cannot change from the rate initially
disclosed. However, a "contract could contain a stepped-rate or stepped-fee
schedule providing for specified changes in the rate or the fees on certain
dates or after a specified period of time."' Alternatively, a creditor could
employ a variable-rate APR, but only if the formula used an index that was
completely outside the creditor's control and viewable by the general
public."' However, the creditor must still impose and disclose a ceiling
interest rate for the life of the credit plan. 2 In either case, the consumer still
has some understanding as to the scope of the possible changes, as opposed to
simply knowing the rates can change at the will of the bank.
With respect to other open-end credit plans, Regulation Z does not
actually restrict change-of-terms provisions from the outset of the contract.
In fact, the regulation actually accounts for changes made pursuant to these
provisions. Whenever a creditor desires to change a term initially required to
be disclosed, the creditor must send written notice fifteen days prior to the
date the change takes effect.5 3 Of course, the regulation also states that a prior
"agreement" relative to the change removes the notice requirement.' The
staff interpretation notes that a "consumer's general acceptance of the
creditor's contract reservation of the right to change terms" does not
constitute an "agreement" for purposes of the disclosure requirement., By
explicitly referring to a creditor's "right to change the terms," so long as the
creditor complies with subsequent notice requirements, the staff interpreta-
tion implicitly recognizes the validity of change-of-terms provisions under
Regulation Z. This simply leaves the states free to legislate around the
underlying issue of what can be changed pursuant to the provision;
Regulation Z merely governs the disclosures of such changes.
48 S 226.5b(0(1).
49 12 C.F.R. S 226.5b(f)(3)(i) cmt. 2 (Supp. I 2006) ("A creditor may not include a general
provision in its agreement permitting changes to any or all of the terms of the plan. For example, creditors
may not include 'boilerplate' language in the agreement stating that they reserve the right to change the
fees imposed under the plan.").
so S 226.5b(f)(3)(i) cmt. 1.




55 12 C.F.R. S 226.9(c)(1) cmt. 3 (Supp. 1 2006).
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For the most part, this federal law allows for credit agreements to simply
disclose that the scope of the contract is indefinite. However, creditors
cannot unexpectedly change the terms of home equity plans, since the
contract must disclose from the outset the scope of the potential changes
pursuant to the change-of-terms provision. Apparently the risk of losing
one's home poses a greater danger than does uncontrolled debt in general.
This distinction at least demonstrates that the Board of Governors recognizes
the dangerous nature of a change-of-terms provision. As ironic as it seems,
Regulation Z purports to protect consumers when in actuality it gives
unsecured creditors carte blanche to mislead consumers. Merely requiring
a subsequent disclosure prior to the effective date of a change does not
address the underlying problem prompting the Truth in Lending Act in the
first place. A consumer needs to know in definite terms what the credit
agreement potentially entails prior to borrowing the money in order to make
an informed decision. 6 An unscrupulous lender's use of a change-of-terms
provision would render an initial disclosure statement meaningless since the




Because the Truth in Lending Act only addresses the disclosure
requirements of a credit plan, and thus only indirectly constrains the use of
change-of-terms provisions, states remain free to regulate the underlying
substance of these contracts. Of course, statutes allowing for unilateral
changes would necessarily trump the common law with respect to contract
formation, as the underlying theory of an indefinite offer would not apply.
Moreover, it would appear that consideration would not be required for the
56 While perusing the Federal Trade Commission's website for material related to change-of-
terms provisions, I stumbled across a citizen's comment addressing the same concerns I share about these
provisions. The comment reads, in relevant part:
If I agree to borrow on credit at a rate that is comfortable for me and I do not falter on my
responsibility in repaying the loan as was agreed when I accepted the offer, and have not
faltered on any of my debt, then I am hard put to understand how the lender can change the
terms. I borrowed the money based on those terms and would not have done so had I known
that the terms would change on me after I consumed the debt. If this is not unfair lending
practices I don't know what is.
Letter from Elizabeth J. Galindo, Re: FACT Act Scores Study; Matter No. P044804 - Comments (2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/creditscoresstudy/510559-0015.pdf.
57 As an aside, I find it quite telling that the "unfair credit contract provisions" of Regulation AA
(which deals with unfair and deceptive practices) lacks a prohibition against change-of-terms provisions.
See 12 C.F.R. § 227.13 (2006).
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change. However, other common law issues would most likely apply, short
of an explicit legislative exemption.
Ever the friend of the corporations, Delaware grants the banks incredible
power to change the terms of an agreement:
Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise
provides, a bank may at any time and from time to time amend such
agreement in any respect, whether or not the amendment or the
subject of the amendment was originally contemplated or addressed
by the parties or is integral to the relationship between the parties.
Without limiting the foregoing, such amendment may change terms
by the addition of new terms or by the deletion or modification of
existing terms, whether relating to plan benefits or features, the rate
or rates of periodic interest, the manner of calculating periodic
interest or outstanding unpaid indebtedness, variable schedules or
formulas, interest charges, fees, collateral requirements, methods for
obtaining or repaying extensions of credit, attorney's fees, plan
termination, the manner for amending the terms of the agreement,
arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, or
other matters of any kind whatsoever. 5
In the event that the consumer does not agree to an amendment that
increases finance charges, he must furnish written notice within the fifteen-
day limit (or longer if allowed by the bank) and cease using the plan. 9 Since
the consumer can continue to repay the outstanding balance pursuant to the
unamended agreement,' this law does not seem too hazardous to the
consumer. However, two concerns still exist. First, the provision allows for
notice to be included in "materials sent to the borrower." 61 In the event that
the notice comes with a periodic statement, the risk of missing the proposed
amendment does not appear too great. However, a bank could attempt to
bundle the amendment in promotional materials that would likely get
discarded without a second thought. Second, any term not requiring initial
disclosure by the Truth in LendingAct "may become effective as determined
by the bank" without the consumer ever knowing about it.62 This allows for
58 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, S 952(a) (West 2005). It seems that New Hampshire has adopted
identical language. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. S 384-G:12 (2005).
59 tit. 5, S 952(b)(2). If a consumer furnishes notice and then continues to use the plan after the





arbitration agreements, forum selection clauses and other terms not directly
related to the cost of lending to become effective at any time and without
prior notice. While the validity of such a statute lies outside the scope of this,
it appears grossly unbalanced and very questionable on its face.
On the same end of the spectrum with respect to change-of-terms
provisions, but less obvious in tone, lies the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code. Most recently amended in 1974 by the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, this uniform code attempts to balance the rights of
consumers with the needs of creditors.' According to the model version of
the Code, "a creditor may change the terms of an open-end credit account
applying to any balance incurred before or after the effective date of the
change" regardless if prior authorization exists or not.64 By removing the
requirement of prior authorization, a change-of-terms provision need not
even exist. Therefore, the existence of one certainly passes muster under this
code. Like the Delaware law, which operates in conjunction with the Truth
in Lending Act, this Code requires prior disclosures for changes which
increase finance charges.65 Of course, this suffers from the same two
problems found in the Delaware law - the potential for subterfuge with
respect to changing finance charges and the blanket allowance for non-
economic provisions.
Although the Code's comment states that the "provision is designed to
allow creditors to change the terms of their open-end accounts in a manner
which is feasible from their standpoint but which safeguards the interests of
their customers,"' other "feasible" alternatives exist. For instance, there
could easily be a requirement that any proposed amendments must come in
specifically labeled envelopes immediately alerting the consumer. This
prevents the attempts ofbundling promotional literature with the subsequent
disclosure requirements. As for other non-economic terms, the disclosure
requirements should apply in the same manner as the economic terms.
Arbitration provisions, for example, may not directly influence how much
one has to pay, but in the event of an economic dispute, it can certainly prove
to be outcome determinative.
63 See 17 AM.JUR. 2D Consumer Protection § 289 (2005). See also Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group
Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Law Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN.
L. REV. 83, 125 n.193 (1993) (explaining that only eleven states adopted this code and in a non-uniform
fashion).
6 Unif. Consumer Credit Code S 3.205(1) (1974).
65 Id. This language substantially retains the scope of the 1968 version, which did not require
notice if "the change involve[d] no significant cost to the debtor." Unif. Consumer Credit Code
S 3.408(3)(c) (1968).
6 Unif Consumer Credit Code S 3.205 cmt. 1 (1974).
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B. Bait and Switch
1. FEDERAL LAW
Congress granted regulatory power to the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") to "prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from
using... unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."
67
Pursuant to that authority, the FTC promulgated the following guide'
defining bait and switch practices:
Bait advertising is an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or
service which the advertiser in truth does not intend or want to sell.
Its purpose is to switch consumers from buying the advertised
merchandise, in order to sell something else, usually at a higher price
or on a basis more advantageous to the advertiser. The primary aim
of a bait advertisement is to obtain leads as to persons interested in
buying merchandise of the type so advertised.69
Essentially, this practice attempts to bait a customer into general dialogue
with the advertiser, on false pretenses, and then exploit this relationship in
the hopes of selling different merchandise.
Before exploring this guide further, it should be noted that the use of the
word "merchandise" after differentiating between "product" and "service"
seems to indicate that the term "merchandise" encompasses both terms.70
However, the subsequent general prohibition states: "No advertisement
containing an offer to sell aproduct should be published when the offer is not
a bona fide effort to sell the advertised produa."71 This appears to merely
reflect clumsy drafting. For instance, one section of the guide states: "No act
or practice should be engaged in by an advertiser to discourage the purchase
of the advertised merchandise as part of a bait scheme to sell other merchandise."72
In one of the ensuing examples in that same section, the word "merchandise"
seems to get interchanged with the word "product." Specifically, the example
highlights "the failure to have available at all outlets listed in the advertise-
ment a sufficient quantity of the advertised product to meet reasonably
67 15 U.S.CA S 45(a)(2) (West 2005) (exempting banks and certain other entities).
68 A guide essentially summarizes specific applications of the law based on actual rulings by the
Federal Trade Commission. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 17 (2006).
69 16 C.F.R. S 238.0 (2006).
70 Id.
71 S 238.1 (emphasis added).
2 S 238.3 (emphasis added).
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anticipated demands, unless the advertisement clearly and adequately
discloses that supply is limited and/or the merchandise is available only at
designated outlets[.]" 73 Based on this apparent discrepancy, it seems
reasonable to assume that every prohibition in the guide refers to products
and services equally. Moreover, there should not be any logical distinction
between using an advertised product as the bait as opposed to using an
advertised service as the bait. The deception remains the same.74
With that in mind, one example of a bait and switch tactic is to
misrepresent the merchandise in the advertisement and then procure the sale
of other merchandise upon disclosure of the true facts.7 ' Another example
deals with the refusal to sell or the disparagement of the advertised merchan-
dise in the hopes of discouraging its sale and encouraging an alternative sale.
76
The final strategy addressed by the guide involves the tactic of actually selling
the advertised merchandise, but subsequently coercing the voiding of the
transaction and procuring alternative merchandise instead. 7 The guide notes:
"Sales of the advertised merchandise do not preclude the existence of a bait
and switch scheme. It has been determined that, on occasions, this is a mere
incidental byproduct of the fundamental plan and is intended to provide an
aura of legitimacy to the overall operation."
7 1
For purposes of a change-of-terms provision, this third strategy fits best
in the analogy. Although the examples given do not deal with a change-of-
73 S 238.3(c) (emphasis added).
74 Once again, it should be noted that this "guide" is a summarization of the decisions by the
Federal Trade Commission as they relate to bait and switch. Going to an actual opinion by the Federal
Trade Commission concerning bait and switch, the language clearly indicated that services could be
switched in addition to products:
In order to prevent recurrence of the above bait and switch scenario, the administrative law
judge entered order provisions which would prohibit respondents from:
(1) Making representations purporting to offer products, installations or services for sale when
the purpose of such representations is not to sell the offered products, installations or services,
but to obtain leads or prospects for the sale of other products, installations or services at higher
prices;
(2) discouraging the purchase of any product, installation or service by failing to deliver or
perform as obligated to;
(3) representing, directly or by implication, that any product, installation or service is offered
for sale by respondents when in fact such offer is not a bona fide offer to sell such product,
installation or service;
(4) * * * misrepresenting in any manner the efficacy, durability, efficiency, composition or
quality of any of respondents' products or services.
In re Southern States Distributing Co., 83 F.T.C. 1126 (1973), 1973 WL 165073 (F.T.C.).
75 See 238.2.
76 See 5 238.3.
7 See §238.4.
78 Id.
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terms provision,79 the result is the same. When a specific service plan is
advertised, the resulting contract creates the general relationship with the
offeror. s° Everything seems legitimate at this point, as the consumer gets the
advertised service, subject only to a change-of-terms provision. So far, so
good. However, suppose the change purports to change the drafter's
performance under the contract, pursuant to the change-of-terms provision.
For instance, suppose a cellular phone company decided that it was no longer
offering phone service on Wednesdays. In the event that the entire plan was
to bait the customer into the original contract and then change the nature of
the service at some time in the future, then surely this constitutes a bait and
switch practice. Clearly the offeror had no intention of selling the advertised
service, but rather intended to sell the modified service instead. This holds
true even if the contract allowed the offeror to terminate at-will. Even
though the offeror could technically terminate the contract at-will,8' the
subsequent offering of a new contract with the changed terms would also
constitute an "unselling" 2 of the original service. In either case, switching the
terms under the color of a terminable-at-will provision or a change-of-terms
provision accomplishes the same illegitimate goal. Indeed, the test for bait
and switch looks to the substance of the transaction, not its form.
Admittedly, a technical distinction exists between the offeror's prior
intention to switch the terms at some future time and the offeror's intention
not to be bound to the terms when they create a financial hardship. In the
event that an unexpected condition arises, a termination coupled with a new
offer most likely does not constitute a bait and switch tactic. Instead, the use
of the change-of-terms provision merely allows for the contract to terminate
based on legitimately changed circumstances. Nonetheless, this distinction
lacks merit when the offeror intends to mislead the consumer.83 When an
advertised service strives to bait the consumer under the pretext of
unchangeable terms, the existence of a change-of-terms provision constitutes
an impermissible mechanism by which the offeror can switch the service
whenever it proves advantageous. Moreover, it would be probative to
examine the terms of newly advertised services and the terms of current
customers that had entered into contracts some time ago. In the event the
79 See id.
so In this section about bait and switch, I use the term "offeror" to refer to the drafter of the
contract of adhesion.
81 See supra Part lI.B.
82 16 C.F.R. S 238.4 (2006).
83 For other prohibitions against misleading advertisements, see Robert Michael Ey, Cause of
Action Under § 43(a) of Lanham Act [15 USC 5 1125] for Misrepresentation in Commercial Advertising or
Promotion, 22 CAUSES OF ACTiON 365 (2005).
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offeror later utilizes the change-of-terms provision to conform the newly
acquired contracts to the terms of the older contracts currently in force with
prior customers, then surely this would indicate a desire to bait and switch.
Of course, if the changes applied to both new customers and old customers
alike pursuant to change-of-terms provisions, this sweeping change would
tend to demonstrate a legitimate changed circumstance.
2. STATE LAW
The 1966 Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act also deals with bait
advertising. According to this Act, a deceptive trade practice occurs when a
person "advertises goods or services with intent not to sell them as
advertised[.] "84 Although the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws decided to withdraw this act in the year 2000,85 twenty-
two states share the language of this particular prohibition.s6 Moreover, at
least nine other states have similarly broad prohibitions against bait and
switch transactions.
s7
A search for cases in which a plaintiff asserted bait and switch activity
pursuant to a change-of-terms provision yielded very little. However, one
case reported does in fact discuss this subject. In Grasso v. First USA Bank,88
84 Unif Deceptive Trade Practices Act S 2(a)(9) (1996) (repealed 2000), available at
http'//www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulcfnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
85 Unif Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Refs. & Annos. (West 2005).
86 The states are as follows: Alabama, ALA. CODE S 8-19-5(9) (1975); Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
45.50.471(b)(8) (West 2005); California, CAL. CIV. CODE S 1770(a)(9) (West 2006); Colorado, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. S 6-1-105(1)(i) (West 2005); Delaware, DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 6, S 2532(a)(9) (West
2005); Georgia, GA. CODEANN. S 10-1-372(a)(9) (West 2005); Hawaii, HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. S 481A-
3(a)(9) (West 2005); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. S 48-603(9) (West 2005); Illinois, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 510/2-2(a)(9) (West 2005); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, S 1212(1)(1) (2005); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. S 325D.44, subdiv. 1(9) (West 2005); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. S 75-24-5(2)(i)
(West 2005); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. S 87-302(a)(9) (West 2005); New Hampshire, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. S 358-A:2(IX) (2005); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 4165.02(A)(11) (West 2005);
Pennsylvania, 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 201-2(4)(ix) (West 2005); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS S 6-
13.1-I(5)(ix); Tennessee, TENN. CODEANN. S 47-18-104(b)(9) (West 2005); Texas, TEX. Bus. &COM.
CODE ANN. S 17.46(b)(9) (2005); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. S 13-1la-3(1)(i) (West 2005); Virginia, VA.
CODE ANN. S 59.1-200(A)(8) (West 2005); and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. S 46A-6-102(7)(I)
(West 2005).
87 The states are as follows: Arkansas, see ARK. CODEANN. S 4-88-107(a)(5) (West 2005); Kansas,
see KAN. STAT. ANN. S 50-626(b)(5) (West 2005); Kentucky, see KY. REv. STAT. ANN. S 517.040 (West
2005); Maryland, see MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW S 14-2903 (West 2005); Missouri, see MO. ANN. STAT.
S 570.170 (West 2005); Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. S 598.0917 (West 2005); New Mexico, see
N.M. STAT. ANN. S 57-12-2(D)(12) (West 2005); Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, S 753(12)
(West 2005); and Wyoming, see WyO. STAT. ANN. S 40-12-105(a)(xiv) (West 2005).
8 713 A.2d 304 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998).
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a credit card holder brought a breach of contract action on the basis of an
APR increase.89 This increase occurred approximately two years after the
formation of the contract.90 When summary judgment was entered in favor
of the defendant, the plaintiff requested an opportunity for further discovery
pursuant to the decision to increase the rate, which the court denied. 9,
Noting in dicta that the request implied that the plaintiffwould subsequently
bring a bait and switch action, the court preemptively declared that a period
of two years, coupled with the volatility of the marketplace, suggested no bait
and switch activity took place."' The exact language of the court was as
follows:
Grasso also argues that she should be allowed further discovery
about First USA's decision to offer a fixed rate, then terminate it.
The Court does not see how this request is relevant. It is based on
her theory that the solicitation is the contract, ignoring the clear and
express provisions in the Agreement. It also ignores that the fixed
rate was in effect for over two years. The implication of Grasso's
request is that there was a bait and switch. The length of time of the
fixed rate and the realities of the market place do not support the
need for this request.93
The fact that the court looked to the "clear and express" right pursuant
to the change-of-terms provision as a factor in its bait and switch analysis,
however, mistakes the point. While I agree with the relevance of the other
two factors-the length of time and the possibility of changed circumstances
-I do not agree with the implicit bootstrapping argument that the language
of the contract provides a legitimate mechanism by which a switch could
occur. This amounts to nothing more than mere ipse dixit on the part of the
offeror.
C. Miscellaneous
In light of this article's attempt to encompass the scope of the law with
respect to change-of-terms provisions, a brief look at two miscellaneous state
statutes should help.
89 See id.
90 Id. at 306.




Under the law of Minnesota, a wireless telecommunications provider
cannot change the terms of a fixed-length contract unless the customer
affirmatively assents orally or in writing.9 In defining what constitutes a
change, the statute broadly refers to potential charges pursuant to the
contract or increased durations.9" Specifically, the statute deals with any
change that "means a modification to, or addition or deletion of, a term or
condition in a contract that could result in an increase in the charge to the
customer under that contract or that could result in an extension of the term
of that contract." 96 After giving written notice sixty days before the effective
date of the change, "[t] he change only becomes effective if the customer opts
in to the change by affirmatively accepting the change prior to the proposed
effective date in writing or by oral authorization.. .. "97 The only potential
ambiguity in this procedural requirement is whether a change-of-terms
provision constitutes a prior affirmative acceptance to all future changes.
Indeed, this would technically satisfy the letter of the law, as this would be
an acceptance "prior to the proposed effective date" of the change. If the
statute had stated that affirmative acceptance must occur subsequent to the
notice and prior to the effective date, then the ambiguity would not exist.
However, since this can be readily inferred by the prior notice requirement,
a change-of-terms provision should not constitute a prior affirmative
acceptance within the spirit of this law.
Aside from wireless contracts, residential leases typically allow for the
landlord to subsequently promulgate rules and regulations that have the
effect of changing the terms of the contract. For instance, my lease agreement
states: "Tenant agrees to comply with all occupancy Rules and Regulations
governing the Property whether now in effect or hereinafter promulgated and
delivered to Tenant." 98 While not technically a change-of-terms provision,
this provision does still allow for the landlord to change the terms by which
the tenant abides by the lease. Since these leases incorporate the rules and
regulations into the terms that govern the contractual duties of the tenant,
these provisions are logically analogous to a change-of-terms provision.
As for the validity of this sort of provision, the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act of 1972 explicitly allows it, albeit in a limited
94 See MINN. STAT. ANN. S 325F.695 (West 2005); 47 C.F.R. S 20.3 (2005) (defining
"commercial mobile radio services" as incorporated by the Minnesota statute).
95 See MINN. STAT. ANN. S 325F.695, subdiv. 1 (d) (West 2005).
%' Id.
9 S 325F.695, subdiv. 3.
98 Dadeland Vista Apartments, Lease Agreement (2004) (emphasis added) (on file with author).
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fashion. As of now, twenty states have substantially adopted the Act." The
relevant provision in the model Act states:
A landlord, from time to time, may adopt a rule or regulation,
however described, concerning the tenant's use and occupancy of the
premises. It is enforceable against the tenant only if (1) its purpose
is to promote the convenience, safety, or welfare of the tenants in the
premises, preserve the landlord's property from abusive use, or make
a fair distribution of services and facilities held out for the tenants
generally; (2) it is reasonably related to the purpose of which it is
adopted; (3) it applies to all tenants in the premises in a fair manner;
(4) it is sufficiently explicit in its prohibition, direction, or limitation
of the tenant's conduct to fairly inform him of what he must or must
not do to comply; (5) it is not for the purpose of evading the
obligations of the landlord; and (6) the tenant has notice of it at the
time he enters into the rental agreement, or when it is adopted. 1°°
Essentially, the rules must be reasonable and made in good faith to benefit
the tenants or to prevent abusive use of the landlord's property.
That seems well and good, except for the potential applications. What
constitutes a benefit to the tenants? Would a rule requiring monetary
contributions, for purposes of the installation of a security gate around the
premises, promote the "safety" of the tenants? Does it matter that the lease
originally allowed pets, but then a new regulation forbid pets on the basis of
"preserving" the landlord's property? According to the next part of the
provision, if the change "works a substantial modification of [the tenant's]
bargain it is not valid unless the tenant consents to it in writing."'0 1
Therefore, under this particular Act, a landlord cannot unilaterally impose
rules and regulations purporting to substantially alter the terms of a
residential lease agreement. However, the landlord reserves the right to
promulgate reasonable and de minimis terms, so long as the changes benefit
the tenants as a whole or protect the landlord's property from abuse.
99 See Unif. Residential Landlord & Tenant Act, Refs. & Annos. (West 2006). The states are:
Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Washington. Id. I have not verified whether each state has adopted this particular provision. However, I
discovered that Nevada has also substantially adopted this particular provision. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
5 118A.320(1) (West 2006).
100 Unif. Residential Landlord & Tenant Act S 3.102(a) (1972).
1 S 3.102(b).
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IV. COMMON LAW DEFENSES
When a change-of-terms provision relates to fixed-length contractual
term, the analysis of an at-will relationship breaks down. In at-will contracts,
any changed terms would relate to future performance that the drafter did
not have a duty to perform. In this part, the analysis will shift from the ability
to terminate the relationship at-will to the ability to change the extent of the
drafter's performance prior to the fulfillment of a contract. Accordingly, the
analysis will look to the doctrines of reasonable expectations and unconscion-
ability. Assuming that the drafter can unilaterally modify both parties'
executory performance, the final part of the analysis will look to the
requirement of good faith and how it applies to exercising the right to change
the terms.
A. Reasonable Expectations
In 1970, Professor Robert Keeton wrote a pivotal article detailing the
concept of reasonable expectations as applied to insurance contracts. 10 2
Keeton summarized the doctrine in the following manner: "The objectively
reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the
terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study
of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations."' 03 Even if
an insurance policy explicitly excludes coverage, it cannot defeat the
reasonable expectations of the insured."° This rationale incorporated the
realities of standard contracts of adhesion, noting that the average person
would not read the terms anyway and that insurance companies have
attempted to take advantage of this fact.0 5 Essentially, this doctrine serves to
prevent sophisticated insurance companies from taking advantage of
unsophisticated insureds.
This doctrine has not yet evolved to fully encapsulate adhesion contracts
other than ones in the insurance industry.' °6 However, the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts encourages just such an expansion. Specifically,
102 Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961
(1980).
103 Id. at 967.
104 Id. at 968.
105 Id.
106 See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two
Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 844-846 (1990). See also Alan M. White & Cathy L. Mansfield, Literacy and
Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233,245-251 (2002).
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section 211 provides: "Where the other party has reason to believe that the
party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement."0 7 In order
to aid such a finding, one can infer that any term that "eviscerates the non-
standard terms explicitly agreed to" materially conflicts with the reasonable
expectation of the contract."8 In accordance with the nature of a change-of-
terms provision, "[t] he inference is reinforced if the adhering party never had
an opportunity to read the term... [or it was] hidden from view."'09 Indeed,
any new terms imposed after the formation of the contract are by definition
"hidden from view." Even though a consumer rarely reads or understands
most of the terms of an adhesive contract, this comment from the Restate-
ment implies that a consumer reasonably expects that the original terms in
the contract represent the entirety of the agreement, notwithstanding the
change-of-terms provision. Although this concept of definiteness is not
"explicit" in the sense that the consumer explicitly agreed upon the definite-
ness of the contract, it is certainly arguable that such an understanding is so
engrained into the concept of a contract that it rises to the level of reasonable
expectations. As such, any use of a change-of-terms provision would conflict
with a consumer's expectations of definiteness.
To better understand the application of this doctrine, as it applies to
terms explicitly in the scope of the non-drafting party's reasonable expecta-
tions," ° consider the following two cases. In Lauvetz v. Alaska Sales and
Service, a rental car policy provided for an optional collision damage waiver."'
The face of the agreement merely said "See Terms and Conditions;" the
terms clearly excluded damage caused as a result of drunk driving."'
Nonetheless, the court held that a person would reasonably assume that a
collision waiver did exactly what it sounded like it did; namely, a person
would not be held responsible for collision damage to the car because the
rental company would waive such liability." 3 Even sophisticated customers
107 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 211(3) (1981). This appears to constitute the
deception leading to surprise in the procedural unconscionability analysis. See infta note 131 and
accompanying text.
108 S 211cmt. f (emphasis added).
109 Id.
Ito This is in reference to the basic terms of the contract that the non-drafting party has surely
noticed and considered. Other boilerplate language, such as choice-of-law and the like, is implicitly in the
scope insomuch as a consumer expects the terms, whatever they may be, to represent the final agreement.
As I reasoned earlier, this expectation is so fundamental that it logically parallels an explicit understanding.
il 828 P.2d 162, 162 (Alaska 1991).
112 Id. at 163.
113 Id. The driver "merely had the choice between a damage waiver and no waiver, protection
against damaging the car or no protection. In deciding today that a consumer would reasonably expect that
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enjoy the protections of this doctrine. In UPMC Health System v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, UPMC negotiated an insurance policy for its
employees." 4 When Metropolitan issued the policy, it included a change-of-
terms provision and it had reduced the two-year duration to only one-year,
all by means of an integration provision. 5 When Metropolitan later
attempted to utilize the change-of-terms provision, UPMC sought a
declaratory judgment that the prior agreement superseded the modified
language of the policy, thereby rendering the change-of-terms provision
invalid.116 The court held that the prior agreement created a reasonable
expectation of the terms of the policy and that any subsequent changes
cannot override the expectations.
11 7
Based on the foregoing discussion, the application of a change-of-terms
provision cannot reasonably be expected by an ordinary consumer when it
conflicts with the primary and explicit terms of the contract. For example,
when a person signs up for a one-year contract for cable service over the
phone at a designated price and with a designated channel lineup, one surely
expects that neither would change. If one were to carefully read the
subsequent Comcast Subscriber Agreement, one would find a change-of-
terms provision that clearly allowed for adjustments to the price and the
channel lineup."' The relevant provision states: "[W]e have the right to
change our Service and Equipment and our prices or fees, at any time. We
also may rearrange, delete, add to or otherwise change the Service provided
on our Basic Service or other levels of Service." 9 The doctrine of
reasonable expectations would most likely protect consumers from these
changes, even though they are clearly referenced in the change-of-terms
provision. Otherwise, the change-of-terms provision would allow for
Comcast to "eviscerate" the most fundamental terms of the contract in the
eyes of the consumer, making the bargain illusory.
This next example should also help highlight the expectations of
definiteness as it relates to all of the terms, explicitly in the consumer's scope
the rental company's waiver is complete, wejoin the large number of courts who have refused to enforce
damage waiver exclusions under a variety of circumstances. Id. at 166. This reasoning seems to hinge on
the absence of any immediate notice on the face of the agreement that exclusions applied. A phrase simply
directing one to refer to the complete terms seems not to raise a presumption of exclusions.
114 391 F.3d 497, 499 (3rd Cir. 2004).
115 Id. at 500.
116 Id. at 501.
117 Id. at 503-04. This meshes with the logic against shrinkwrap licenses, in which the future terms
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or otherwise. Upon visiting my local mall, I. ventured to a Sprint® kiosk and
asked for a copy of a wireless phone contract. The contract allows either for
a one-year or two-year agreement.120 The right hand column of the contract
contains blank spaces in which the individual charges per month are entered
by the salesperson; the final monthly charge is calculated at the bottom.
2'
On its face, this contract creates the pretense of a definite and unchangeable
monthly charge. However, this pretense cannot be accidental. Indeed, it
clearly and purposefully creates the reasonable, but incorrect, expectation that
the monthly charge will not change during the length of the agreement. The
contract then conveniently incorporates a change-of-terms provision by
reference into the contract.' 22 In lieu of this change-of-terms provision, the
monthly rate language deceptively creates the reasonable expectation that the
rate would stay the same for the length of the contract. As for implicit
matters, of which the consumer did not read or understand, the change-of-
terms provision would be invalid simply because the consumer reasonably
expects all terms, implicit or explicit with respect to the scope of the
consumer's understanding, to maintain definiteness.
B. Unconscionability
Another legal defense to the unfairness of a change-of-terms provision
is the doctrine of unconscionability. Unlike the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, this defense clearly applies to a wide variety of contracts,
especially contracts ofadhesion.' 23 In finding unconscionability, a court looks
to any "'absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party.'" 2 4 Essentially, the "absence of meaningful choice" factor describes the
procedural aspect of unconscionability, while the "unreasonably favorable"
factor describes the substantive aspects .' Although both aspects must be
present in order for a court to find a contract unconscionable, a substantial
12D Sprint, Welcome to Sprint, JU5606-7205, at 1, S 8 (2005) (on file with author).
121 See id.
122 See id.; Sprint, TERMS & CONDITIONS OF SERVICE S 1.2 (2006), available at
http://www.sprint.com/ratesandconditions/residentia/documents/sprinttermsandconditions.pdf (last
visited on Oct. 25,2006).
123 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 208, cmt. a (1981).
124 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS S 18:9 (4th ed. 1991) (citing Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)). This analysis applies to a contract
as a whole or to specific provisions. See id. Since this article looks only to the validity of a change-of-terms
provision, this defense should apply only to the provision or the changed terms pursuant to the provision.
125 See S 18:10.
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showing of one aspect can supplement a much more moderate degree of the
other aspect.
126
However, a change-of-terms provision creates an unusual problem with
respect to unconscionability. Because these provisions enable additional
terms, they should be tested for unconscionability both on their face and as
they are applied. An analysis on the face of such a provision would have the
effect of preventing any changes. In order to satisfy this, the usual tests of
procedural and substantive unconscionability would apply to the provision
itself. Assuming the provision does not qualify as being unconscionable, an
as-applied change must undergo a separate analysis. In this event, this
particular term could only be declared unconscionable if the term failed both
the procedural and substantive tests. Even though this as-applied analysis
stands apart from the analysis of the underlying change-of-terms provision,
the particular term need not be independently examined in a vacuum. Since
the change-of-terms provision serves as the mechanism by which changes
occur, one must examine the change along with the underlying provision as
part of the overall circumstances of the contract.
1. PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY
Not every state considers the adhesiveness of a contract as relevant to a
finding of unconscionability. 27 Others, however, fully equate adhesiveness
with procedural unconscionability. 128 This latter view more accurately takes
into account the factors that go into the procedural analysis. The Supreme
Court of Mississippi, for example, articulated these factors as "a lack of
knowledge, lack of voluntariness, inconspicuous print, the use of complex
legalistic language, disparity in sophistication or bargaining power of the
parties and/or a lack of an opportunity to study the contract and inquire about
the contract terms." 129 The courts of California condense this list of factors
into: "(1) oppression, arising from inequality of bargaining power and the
absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice, and (2) surprise, resulting
from hiding the disputed term in a prolix document."130 The use of the word
"surprise" seems to be more of a substantive test, as explained shortly. The
phrase "resulting from" receives emphasis because this implies that the
126 See id.
127 See, e.g., Clark v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 706 N.W.2d 471,474-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
128 See, e.g., Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 ("A finding of a
contract of adhesion is essentially a finding of procedural unconscionability.").
129 MS Credit Center, Inc. v. Horton, 926 So. 2d 167, 177 (Miss. 2006).
130 Vance v. Villa Park Mobilehome Estates, 36 Cal. App. 4th 698, 709 (1995) (emphasis added).
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behavior causing the later surprise is the procedural element of concern and
not the surprise itself.
Applying this test, a contract of adhesion, as it relates to mere consumers,
precludes negotiation by its very definition. This aspect, coupled with the
obvious inequality between corporations and individual consumers,
necessarily means that a contract of adhesion satisfies the "oppression" factor
of procedural unconscionability. The "surprise" factor implies procedural
naughtiness by means other than hiding an important clause in the myriad
of fine print. Even though the standard contract of adhesion normally will
satisfy the California test of surprise merely due to its length and the
presence of inconspicuous terms, I posit that the spirit of surprise strongly
incorporates the doctrine of reasonable expectations.'
This idea finds support from Samuel Williston. He incorporates
reasonable expectations into one variation of the substantive test of
unconscionability by referring to the negation of reasonable expectations.
3 2
However, this implies that the drafter intended to mislead the consumer into
forming these expectations in the first place, thus requiring a procedural
analysis of that conduct. 133 The substantive surprise stems from the later
awareness of deception in which such reasonable expectations were procured
by the drafter. Indeed, the court in Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co. observed that
"[u]nconscionability may involve deception .... ' 34 Deception occurs when
the drafter purposefully misleads the consumer into believing that certain
terms cannot change. This type of analysis more accurately reflects the
factors dealing with a consumer's level of understanding and choice found
in the unconscionability calculus. As Justice O'Connor sees it, "a determina-
tion that a contract is 'unconscionable' may in fact be a determination that
one party did not intend to agree to the terms of the contract."
35
In the likely event that the underlying change-of-terms provision turns
out to be procedurally unconscionable, the drafter would be hard pressed to
explain how any resulting changes were not also procedurally unconscion-
able. These changes would of course be procedurally unconscionable and
131 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
132 See 8 RiCHARDA. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS S 18:10 (4th ed. 1991). If this doctrine
truly does play a sufficient, albeit not necessary, part ofunconscionability, this lends additional credibility
to the Restatement's position that this doctrine should not be explicitly confined to insurance contracts.
133 Although the doctrine of reasonable expectations does not require a showing of deceit, this
corollary can be fairly implied. Indeed, a contract of adhesion reflects very careful and deliberate drafting,
as well as placement of the terms. In the unlikely event that the reasonable expectations were carelessly
created by an ambiguity, then the procedural element may be lacking.
IM 125 P.3d 814, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
135 American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219,249 (1995) (O'Connor,J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
CHANGE-OF-TERMS PROVISIONS
this conclusion must be so. If procedural unconscionability looks to a lack of
meaningful choice, then anything stemming from this original sin would
share the same taint. Built upon such unconscionable premises, any
application of the provision would still fail for want of meaningful choice. To
consider a change being procedurally conscionable, simply because it
properly conformed to the underlying change-of-terms provision, would
constitute an illogical bootstrapping argument. 36 This would be analogous
to sending a man to jail pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, simply on
the belief that due process cured the otherwise underlying, and quite
significant, defect.
In the unlikely event that a change-of-terms provision appears procedur-
ally conscionable or the original sin logic fails, a completely separate and
independent analysis must be made for any particular changes. Grounded on
similar circumstances, it stands to reason that an examination of case law
involving a wireless phone contract sufficiently addresses the topic of proce-
dural unconscionability as it applies to'other types of large-scale consumer
contracts. With that in mind, consider the case of Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley.
137
The relevant issue in that case concerned the addition of an arbitration
provision pursuant to the underlying change-of-terms provision.' 38 Because
the new provision did not allow for negotiation, but rather required
acceptance or termination of the service, the court found it adhesive in
nature. 139 Moreover, the resulting economic loss from choosing to cancel the
service actually elevated the "lack of meaningful choice" analysis.'" Finally,
the drafter's inconspicuous bundling of the new term with the bill, without
bringing attention to the specific change in any reasonable manner, doomed
the arbitration provision as being procedurally unconscionable.'
2. SUBSTANTIVE UNCONSCIONABILITY
Substantive unconscionability looks to the reasonableness of the terms.
As the topic of negating reasonable expectations has already been addressed,
136 See, e.g., supra Part III.B.2.
137 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
138 See id. at 572.
139 Id. at 575.
140 See id. ("[S]witching providers would result in a loss of the investment the customers have in
the agreements they made with Powertel. They purchased equipment that works only with the Powertel
service and they have obtained telephone numbers that cannot be transferred to a new provider.").
141 See id. ("The pamphlet containing the clause appears at first glance to be little more than a
restatement of the original terms and conditions of service. Apart from the effective date printed in small
print below the title 'Terms and Conditions of Service,' there is nothing to indicate that the pamphlet
contains anything new.").
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the remainder of the discussion will focus on other types of analysis.
Examples include "terms that impair the integrity of the bargaining process
or... unreasonably and unexpectedly harsh terms having to do with price or
other central aspects of the transaction. 4 2 Another aspect of substantive
unconscionability involves the "'one-sidedness of the contractual provision
in question.'"' 43
The first example speaks of impairing the bargaining process. A change-
of-terms provision does more than simply "impair" the bargaining process.
By definition, it completely destroys the bargaining process. Once the
consumer agrees to be bound to future terms, the consumer's ability to
bargain over modifications evaporates. As for unreasonably harsh terms,
being bound to the will of the drafter clearly satisfies this test. Even if the
consumer has the ability to terminate the contract instead of accepting the
new terms, early termination fees usually apply.' 44 In that respect, the
change-of-terms provision allows for a potential situation in which the
consumer finds himself unreasonably stuck between a rock and a hard place.
In the event that termination fees do not apply, these provisions still deprive
consumers of the benefit of the bargain, be it through a reluctant termination
or the imposition of an unexpected change. As for one-sidedness, this seems
too plain for argument. Any contract that gives one party the sole and
unilateral ability to change the contract as that party sees fit unconscionably
favors that party.
Based on the foregoing discussion, a change-of-terms provision reflects
the unreasonableness prompting the unconscionability defense. However,
others could argue that the provision does nothing unreasonable by itself. In
142 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS S 18:10 (4th ed. 1991).
143 Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918,922 (N.D. 2005) (quoting Construction
Assocs., Inc. v. Fargo Water Equip., 446 N.W.2d 237, 241 (N.D. 1989)).
144 For example, look at this provision in the Verizon Wireless agreement, which requires the early
termination fee unless the change causes an undefined "material adverse effect":
Your service is subject to our business policies, practices, and procedures, which we can change
without notice. UNLESS OTHERWISE PROHIBITED BY LAW, WE CAN ALSO
CHANGE PRICES AND ANY OTHER CONDITIONS IN THIS AGREEMENT AT
ANY TIME BY SENDING YOU WRITTEN NOTICE PRIOR TO THE BILLING
PERIOD IN WHICH THE CHANGES WOULD GO INTO EFFECT. IF YOU CHOOSE
TO USE YOUR SERVICE AFTER THAT POINT, YOU'RE ACCEPTING THE
CHANGES. IF THE CHANGES HAVE A MATERIAL ADVERSE EFFECT ON YOU,
HOWEVER, YOU CAN END THE AFFECTED SERVICE, WITHOUT ANY EARLY
TERMINATION FEE, JUST BY CALLING US WITHIN 60 DAYS AFTER WE SEND
NOTICE OF THE CHANGE.
Verizon Wireless, CustomerAgreement, http;//www.verizonwireless.conx/b2c/footer/customerAgreement.jsp
(click on the "View Customer Agreement" link, enter "33143" in the zipcode box, and then click the
"Submit" button) (last visited Oct. 25,2006).
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fact, the provision standing alone does nothing at all. The only time the
consumer could be harmed by the change-of-terms provision would be
when changes were actually made. Of course, any change unfavorable to the
consumer could fail by default if it negated the reasonable expectation of
definitiveness or eviscerated an explicitly agreed upon term. If one were to
reject my earlier argument that the doctrine of reasonable expectations
necessarily includes the expectation of definitiveness,'45 and the particular
change did not eviscerate an explicitly agreed upon term, then an as-applied
analysis would be made.
The only problem at this point would be that most changes made
pursuant to the provision probably would not be substantively unconscion-
able standing alone. For instance, an arbitration provision would not seem
overly harsh by itself.' 46 The only counter would be that the consumer's
inability to receive the benefit of the prior bargain, regardless if the consumer
understood the benefit in the first place, makes the change unreasonably
unfair relative to this backdrop. This argument parallels the procedural
unconscionability logic presented in this article, in which the underlying
taint of unconscionability spreads to all of the changes. 47 While distinguish-
able in that the underlying provision initially passes the substantive uncon-
scionability test on its face, this logic would still cause every change to be
substantively unconscionable by reference. By "reference" I mean the con-
textual reference to the potential unconscionability created by the underlying
provision in the first place, only now transformed from a potential
unconscionability to a kinetic one. Therefore, it would not make sense to say
that the underlying provision does not fail the unconscionability test but all
of the changes fail the test by default for depriving the consumer the benefit
of the bargain. It would make more sense to condense the logic into an
understanding that the underlying provision must be substantively
unconscionable. By doing as such, the same result would be attained, as the
analysis would still focus on the source of the changes from a substantive
standpoint.
C. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Assuming that the change-of-terms provision survives scrutiny, there
exists one final doctrine to protect the consumer from the drafter's
overreaching. Without this doctrine of good faith and fair dealing, a change-
145 See discussion supra Part IVA
146 See, e.g., Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (reversing the lower
court's determination that a basic arbitration provision fails the unconscionability test).
147 See supra text accompanying note 136.
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of-terms provision might otherwise render the entire contract illusory.
"[T]he fact that one of the parties reserves the power of fixing or varying the
price or other performance is not fatal if the exercise of this power is subject
to prescribed or implied limitations, as that the variation must be in
proportion to some objectively determined base or must be reasonable." 4 '
According to the Restatement, this doctrine "emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as
involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards of decency,
fairness or reasonableness."'4 9 The Restatement subsequently highlights the
"abuse of a power to specify terms" as one example of bad faith.5 Since a
change-of-terms provision grants the drafter such a power, it must be
analyzed in this light.
The California court deciding Badie v. Bank ofAmerica reasoned that the
drafter's power to change the terms must be initially limited in scope to "the
universe of terms included in the original agreements."'"' In other words, the
court did not look first to whether an arbitration provision by itself exceeded
the scope of good faith, but whether the change-of-terms provision
reasonably allowed for this term in the first place. 2 The exact language of
the provision did not particularly matter; explicitly reserving the ability to
"add" or "delete" terms did not change the analysis. 3 The issue of funda-
mental importance is the scope of the provision as it relates to the original
bargain. In order to ascertain the scope, the court applied standard contract
interpretation principles.'54 Based on the absence of any terms concerning
potential legal disputes, the court reasoned that this area was not part of the
scope of the contract and therefore not within the scope of the change-of-
terms provision 55
Based on this logic, a change-of-terms provision cannot be used to add
completely new terms to the contract. If anything, the provision allows for
modifications of terms explicitly included or reasonably alluded to in the
original contract. The court referred to a law review article by Steven J.
148 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS S 98, at 438-39 (1963).
149 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 205 cmt. a (1981).
ISO S 205 cmt. d.
"st 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273,285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
152 Id. at 284.
"3 Id. at 285.
154 Id. at 285-86.
155 Id. at 287 ("[Tjhere is nothing about the original terms that would have alerted a customer to
the possibility that the Bank might one day in the future invoke the change of terms provision to add a
clause that would allow it to impose ADR on the customer.").
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Burton, 156 in which Burton argued that "[b]ad faith performance occurs
precisely when discretion is used to recapture opportunities forgone upon
contracting .... Good faith performance, in turn, occurs when a party's
discretion is exercised for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation
of the parties at the time of formation .... "" Burton subsequently indicated
two factors to be taken into account with respect to an analysis of good faith.
In the context of consumer contracts of adhesion, the first test looked to the
subjective motivation of the drafter for implementing a change.' The
second test looked to the objective scope of the consumer's expectations.
5 9
The Badie court essentially applied this second test for purposes of deter-
mining what types of changes were initially permissible."W The first test,
however, seems to analyze a term's reasonableness in the context of whether
or not the change reflects a legitimate motive. Burton analyzed the issue of
good faith in the context of sophisticated entities, and as such, the reasonable
scope assumes that each party knew the potential risks for each other and
would understand how changed circumstances could affect the relation-
ship.16' However, there does not appear to be any reason why his analysis
cannot be adapted to adhesive consumer contracts as well. The only
difference would be that the consumer would not take the circumstances of
the drafter's economics into account, but would simply rely on the wording
on the form contract.
The drafter, however, would still have been under a duty to set the terms
based on a good faith analysis of the possible risks involved. Those risks, in
turn, would of course be related to the cost of doing business. If the motive
for utilizing a change-of-terms provision pertains to increasing profit simply
on the basis of trying to recapture a foregone opportunity, then clearly this
amounts to bad faith. However, in the event the drafter attempts to utilize
the provision in an attempt to preserve profit in the event of a foreseeable
changed circumstance, then the analysis puts the burden on the drafter to
have factored this possible circumstance into the original contract. Therefore,
156 Id. at 284.
157 StevenJ. Burton, Breach of Contraa and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv.
L. REV. 369, 373 (1980). Once again, the reference to "reasonable contemplation" seems to incorporate
the doctrine of reasonable expectations, except more broadly.
158 Id. at 386.
159 Id.
160 Adopting similar logic, the court in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery stated that: "A customer would
not expect that a major corporation could choose to disregard potential contractual opportunities and then
later, if it changed its mind, impose them on the customer unilaterally." 593 S.E.2d 424, 432 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2004).
161 "Good faith performance cases typically involve arm's-length transactions, often between
sophisticated business persons." Burton, supra note 157, at 383.
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the drafter must still have a reasonable motive-protecting its profit as
opposed to exploiting it-and it must have factored such potential circum-
stances into the original terms. At very least, the drafter should set a range of
values as they relate to terms that have an adjustable character, such as costs.
This way, a consumer receives protection from his inability to understand
the realities of the market, but can nonetheless still be able to make a decision
that implicitly takes these realities into account.
V. CONCLUSION
The primary reason for writing this article was to generate discourse on
the prevalent usage of change-of-terms provisions in adhesive consumer
service contracts. Since most of these form contracts contain arbitration
provisions, it is very difficult to find case law explicitly dealing with the
subject. Another possible explanation for the lack of material would be the
lack of recorded trial court opinions. While a change-of-terms provision will
rarely give way to outrageous terms, the principle of consumer protection
still demands that attention be given to the inherent unfairness of such terms.
Each individual change may be negligible to any particular consumer, but the
aggregate of these changes definitely adds up. The increase of one dollar a
month, when applied to one million consumers, amounts to an increase of
twelve million dollars a year. When such a windfall results from the unsavory
business practice of exploiting the consumer, one cannot help but be
concerned.
To summarize this article, one must determine if the provision
constitutes part of the contract before one can go about analyzing a change-
of-terms provision. 162Because such provisions make offers indefinite, which
is in stark contrast with the common law requirement that offers contain
definite terms, a court might sever the provision from the offer.63 This
conclusion derives itself by analogy to the concept of rolling contracts."
These contracts involve terms that appear indefinite, insomuch as they keep
changing throughout the formation process 65 Shrinkwrap licenses, the
typical rolling contracts, provide for two opposing analyses." Based on one
theory, a provision alerting a consumer to additional hidden terms cannot
retroactively incorporate those terms into the offer. 167 As a result, any
162 See discussion supra Part II.
163 See discussion supra Part IIA.
164 See discussion supra Part I1A
165 See discussion supra Part IIA
166 See discussion supra Part II.A.
167 See discussion supra Part 11A
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additional terms cannot contradict the otherwise definite and complete
contract, making any such changes mere modifications proposals that would
have to be supported by consideration. 16s The other theory, which posits that
the notice of additional terms defers the power of acceptance until one views
the terms, implies that the offer cannot be complete until one views the
terms.'69 Analogizing this view to a change-of-terms provision, acceptance
would never be possible, as the drafter would retain the unlimited right to
constantly modify the offer.' ° As a result, this logic would not be applicable
to change-of-terms provisions, requiring instead the former modification
analysis.'
In the case of periodic contracts, a unilateral change-of-terms does not
violate the contract.72 Rather, the provision apparently granting this power
amounts to nothing more than mere surplusage 73 Since the drafting party
has no obligation to continue to provide service under the terms of the
current offer at the end of a period, a change really refers to the drafter's
inherent ability to revoke the current offer and present a changed offer.
7 4
However, characterizing a periodic contract at-will, with respect to the ability
to prevent renewal, requires one to examine the length of the contract and
the way it is terminated."' When a periodic contract renews by default, the
drafter might be able to affirmatively prevent the renewal and thereby change
the terms pursuant to a new offer.176 When a periodic contract ends by
default, but still gives the consumer the option to renew the contract, the
drafter cannot revoke the offer at-will.' 7
From a statutory perspective, change-of-terms provisions appear to have
legislative approval.77 The federal Truth in Lending Act, which regulates the
disclosure requirements of a lending agreement, limits a national bank's
ability to change the financial terms only in open-end home equity plans. 79
For the other types of open-end credit plans, including unsecured loans, the
disclosure requirements merely restrict immediate changes of the terms. °
168 See discussion supra Part I1A.
169 See discussion supra Part IIA.
170 See discussion supra Part II.A.
171 See discussion supra Part IIA
172 See discussion supra Part lI.B.
173 See discussion supra Part II.B.
174 See discussion supra Part ll.B.
175 See discussion supra Part II.B.
176 See discussion supra Part ll.B.
177 See discussion supra Part II.B.
178 See discussion supra Part III.
17 See discussion supra Part IIIA.1.
180 See discussion supra Part IIIA.1.
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Instead, the changes need to be disclosed prior to their effective date.' 8 ' On
a state level, at least twelve states, of which Delaware is one, explicitly
authorize banks to change the terms at-will, including the non-financial
terms.i
2
Another statutory area of law involves bait and switch prohibitions. This
activity occurs when a consumer unwittingly forms the initial business
relationship with the service provider under false pretenses.' 3 Typically, a
consumer responds to an insincere advertisement, only to be tricked into
purchasing something that is more advantageous to the offeror. s4 However,
a bait and switch can occur subsequent to the formation of a contract when
the contract terminates in lieu of another transaction."'5 While not explicitly
forbidding change-of-terms provision, the spirit of bait and switch
prohibitions should encompass this application.18 6 For instance, the use of a
change-of-terms provision to essentially terminate the existing contract,
either explicitly or implicitly, and subsequently foist upon the consumer a
contract with terms more advantageous to the drafter, surely constitutes a
bait and switch.
187
Aside from lending practices and bait and switch prohibitions, state
statutory prohibitions regulate other miscellaneous types of contracts.'8s For
instance, the state of Minnesota requires affirmative acceptance by wireless
phone consumers in the case of changed charges or durations."s While a
change-of-terms provision may arguably constitute an initial affirmative
acceptance that applies to all such changes, this interpretation of the law
seems doubtful."9 Moreover, various other states have adopted provisions of
the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.' 9' One of the provisions
of that uniform act limits a landlord's ability to change the terms of the lease
agreement as they relate to the rules and regulations.' 92 Specifically, the
promulgated rules and regulations cannot be material and they must either
11 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
182 See discussion supra Part IIIA2.
183 See discussion supra Part III.B.
184 See discussion supra Part III.B.
185 See discussion supra Part III.B.
186 See discussion supra Part III.B.
187 See discussion supra Part III.B.
188 See discussion supra Part III.C.
189 See discussion supra Part III.C.
190 See discussion supra Part III.C.
191 See discussion supra Part III.C.
192 See discussion supra Part III.C.
CHANGE-OF-TERMS PROVISIONS
benefit the tenants as a whole or protect the landlord's property from
damage. 3
Assuming that the change-of-terms provision becomes part of the
contract, one must look to the common law concepts of reasonable
expectations, unconscionability, and the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."9 The doctrine of reasonable expectations attempts to establish
an objectively reasonable assumption that the consumer has about the terms
of the agreement."5 Indeed, the doctrine assumes that the drafter of the
contract intentionally tries to create such assumptions in the mind of the
consumer in order to consummate the deal.'" However, if the terms of the
contract act to modify the assumption, the terms are invalid, even if the
consumer has the ability to read them.'9 ' By analogy, a change-of-terms
provision is invalid as it grants the drafter the power to change the apparently
settled terms of the contract as well.98 This doctrine arguably also includes
the expectation of definiteness as it relates to the entirety of the terms in
general, whatever they may be. 99
Another defense to the imposition of a change-of-terms provision lies in
the doctrine ofunconscionability. °" The doctrine can apply to the face of the
provision or it can apply to the particular changes promulgated pursuant to
the provision.20' This doctrine has a procedural and substantive component,
in which the procedural component looks to a lack of meaningful choice on
the part of the consumer and the substantive component looks to the
reasonableness of the terms.202 For the most part, a contract of adhesion will
fail the procedural analysis by default, which implies that any changes
pursuant to such a provision should also fail the procedural analysis as well. °3
As for the substantive component of such a provision, its ability to negate the
reasonable expectations of the primary terms as well as the expectation of
definiteness should render it substantively unconscionable on its face.2" As
almost any change will deprive the consumer of the benefit of his bargain by
193 See discussion supra Part III.C.
194 See discussion supra Part IV.
199 See discussion supra Part IVA.
19 See discussion supra Part IVA
197 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
198 See discussion supra Part IVA
199 See discussion supra Part IVA
Wo See discussion supra Part IV.B.
201 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
2M See discussion supra Part IV.B.
M See discussion supra Part W.B.
3M See discussion supra Part N.B.
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default, the provision should be declared substantively unconscionable by
default as well. 05
Finally, assuming that a change-of-terms provision can exist, the drafter
must still comply with the requirements of good faith and fair dealing.206 For
the most part, the change-of-terms provision cannot attempt to add
completely new subject areas that were neither anticipated nor dealt with in
the original contract. 20 7 This limitation stems from the prohibition on the
drafter's attempt to use the provision to recapture foregone opportunities. 20 '
In the same general vein of reasoning, the provision cannot be employed
when the drafter attempts to deal with circumstances that the drafter should
have anticipated and incorporated into the original terms of the contract. 209
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
